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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on an econometric investigation of the macroeconomic 
and political factors that contributed to Greece’s excessive debt accumulation 
and its failure to adequately address its fiscal imbalances, from the restoration 
of democracy in 1974 till the crisis of 2009. The econometric investigation is 
based on a model in which two political parties alternate in power, and in 
which governments choose primary expenditure and taxes to minimize 
deviations from politically determined expenditure and tax targets, subject to 
a debt accumulation equation. The model predicts a political equilibrium in 
which primary expenditure and taxes follow feedback rules which go in the 
direction of stabilizing the debt to GDP ratio. However, this stabilization 
incentive is weaker in election years. The model also predicts potential 
partisan differences in the evolution of primary expenditure and taxes, due to 
the different preferences of political parties. Estimates of government 
reaction functions to public debt for the period 1975-2009 suggest a rather 
weak stabilizing reaction of primary deficits to public debt. This stabilizing 
reaction disappears in election years, which are characterized by strong fiscal 
expansions. We find no evidence of partisan differences in the reaction of 
primary deficits to inherited debt, but we do find evidence of lower primary 
deficits in the post-1992 Maastricht treaty period. Overall the model accounts 
for the accumulation of Greece’s government debt in terms of the trend 
increase in primary expenditure, the positive shocks to primary expenditure in 
election years and the weak stabilizing reaction of government revenue, due 
to tax smoothing. 
Keywords: macroeconomics and politics, government debt, primary deficit, 
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Macroeconomics and Politics in the 
Accumulation of Greece’s Debt: 
An econometric investigation, 1975-2009 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The Greek fiscal situation has been at the center of international 
attention since the end of 2009. The fiscal deficit of Greece increased 
significantly during the international crisis of 2008-09, which hit the 
Greek economy at its Achilles heel:  the refinancing of its persistently 
high public debt. 
In the circumstances that followed the international financial crisis, the 
refinancing of the debt became problematic, and spreads over the 
German benchmark rates started to widen. Greece found itself at the 
center of a wave of criticism by the international press, international 
organizations, rating agencies and the European Commission. Despite 
the fact that the fiscal situation in 2009 had worsened throughout 
Europe and the rest of the world, Greece was the first sovereign to find 
itself in the middle of a confidence crisis which finally forced it to resort 
to a special fund set up by the European Union and adopt a fiscal 
consolidation program supervised by the IMF, the EU Commission and 
the European Central Bank. 
Greece had experienced a steep rise in its government debt to GDP ratio 
during the 1980s. The government debt to GDP ratio rose from about 
20% of GDP in the late 1970s to about 100% of GDP in the early 1990s. 
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Since then, government debt had been stabilized at about 100% of GDP 
and Greece appeared to have had no problems refinancing its debt until 
the end of 2008. Nevertheless, Greece’s high government debt and 
deficits had persisted as significant problems throughout the period. 
Although there were short periods of significant deficit reduction, there 
were many instances of relapse, especially around election years. Given 
this experience, Greece appears as a suitable candidate to test theories 
of the macroeconomics and politics of debt accumulation.
1
 
This paper provides such a systematic examination and test. 
Section 2, contains a brief historical account of how the sovereign debt 
of Greece was accumulated and then stabilized relative to GDP. This 
account highlights the economic and political background behind the 
rapid accumulation of government debt in the 1980s, the inadequately 
implemented convergence programs of the 1990s and Greece’s fiscal 
relapses and failures in implementing the Stability and Growth Pact after 
it was admitted into the euro area. 
Section 3 briefly surveys theoretical models that address the political 
and economic factors that lead to excessive government debt 
accumulation and delayed fiscal stabilizations. The literature focuses 
mainly on the “time inconsistency problems” characterizing ex ante and 
                                                 
1
 A number of papers have explored Greece’s turbulent macroeconomic experience, in order 
to test theories of credibility and politics. Alogoskoufis and Philippopoulos (1992), 
Alogoskoufis (1995) and Alogoskoufis, Lee and Philippopoulos (1998) explored the 
relationship between credibility, politics, inflation and exchange rate regimes. Alogoskoufis 
and Christodoulakis (1991), Alogoskoufis (1995) and Lockwood, Philippopoulos and Tzavalis 
(2001) explored issues of government debt sustainability and the relationship between 
politics, debt accumulation and international institutions, while Alogoskoufis (2011) and 
Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011) have used debt and balance of payments crisis models to 
provide interpretations of the Greek debt crisis. 
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ex post government policies, as well as on political factors, related to the 
incentives of incumbent governments to resort to excessive debt 
accumulation. The role of partisan preferences and the role of elections, 
as well as the strategic interactions between governments also play a 
key role in this literature. 
In section 4 we set up a political economy variant of the public debt 
model of Barro (1979), along the lines of Lockwood, Philippopoulos and 
Snell (1996). We extend the model, by allowing for the electoral effects 
highlighted by Rogoff and Sibert (1989), as well as for different discount 
factors for the two political parties, and analyze its predictions for the 
determination of government deficits and debt.  
In section 5 we proceed to an econometric investigation of the 
predictions of the model for the case of Greece. We estimate the 
government reaction functions to public debt and examine how these 
reaction functions depend on economic and political factors. 
Our estimates suggest the existence of weak debt stabilizing behavior by 
Greek governments, concentrated mainly in non-election years. The 
main instrument used for fiscal adjustment appears to have been 
increases in government revenue. We find evidence of significant 
increases in primary deficits during election years, as predicted by our 
model and other electoral cycle models. We also find some evidence 
that socialist governments are associated with higher primary 
expenditure and taxes, but no evidence of partisan differences in 
primary deficits. Our findings also suggest that Greece’s convergence 
efforts in the post-1992 Maastricht treaty period and its participation in 
the euro area did result in a significant reduction in its primary deficit to 
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GDP ratio, which helped to stabilize public debt until 2008. We finally 
find that fluctuations in euro area GDP growth have a significant effect 
on Greece’s primary deficit, a finding consistent with the existence of 
significant automatic stabilizers. 
Overall, our findings suggest that the driving force behind the 
accumulation of Greece’s high government debt has been the trend 
increase in primary expenditure and the further significant increases in 
primary expenditure during election years, coupled with the weakness of 
the debt stabilization efforts during non-election years, which relied on 
insufficient increases in government revenue. Greece’s participation in 
the single currency project helped reduce its primary deficits and 
stabilize its already high debt to GDP ratio, but it did not shield Greece 
from the effects of electoral and international economic shocks. The 
fiscal destabilization of 2009 can be attributed to a combination of a 
deep international and European recession and another electoral fiscal 
shock. 
The detailed conclusions are summarized in the last section of the paper. 
2.  Politics and Government Debt Accumulation in Greece, 
1975-2009 
One can usefully distinguish four discrete phases in the process of 
government debt accumulation from the restoration of democracy in 
1974 to the Greek fiscal crisis of 2010. The first is the period of 
preparation for EEC entry. It is a relatively short period that lasted 
between 1975 and 1980, in which the government debt to GDP ratio 
remained stable. The second phase is the period of rapid debt 
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accumulation, during the 1980s. The third is the convergence period of 
the 1990s, during preparations for Greece’s entry into the euro area. The 
fourth is the period of euro area participation, from 2000 until 2008, 
before the international financial crisis worsened, with the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. Clearly, the international crisis ushered in a new fifth 
period for Greek macroeconomic policy, which is outside the scope of 
this paper. 
The two parties alternating in power since the restoration of democracy 
in Greece were New Democracy (ND) and the Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement (PASOK). New Democracy positioned itself as the “pro-
market” or “conservative” party and PASOK positioned itself as the 
“socialist” party. Initially the two parties had wide ideological differences 
on just about everything, including participation in the European 
Economic Community, which PASOK opposed. However, since the 
elections of 1993 there was a significant political convergence around 
the national target of participation in the euro area. 
The timing of Greek elections and the political composition of Greek 
governments are summarized in Table 1. New Democracy was in 
government for a total of about 16 years and PASOK for a total of about 
19 years. In the late 1980s there were two short lived coalition 
governments, one of which was a government of National Unity.  
Macroeconomic policy in the first five years after the restoration of 
democracy, with New Democracy in government, was dominated by the 
goal of preparing Greece for EEC entry. The economy recovered quickly 
from the recession of 1974, unemployment was maintained at low 
levels, inflation decelerated and the current account was in surplus. Until 
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1981, the fiscal deficit was contained below 3% of GDP and public debt 
was only around 25% of GDP. The last part of this period was 
characterized by stagflation, caused by the second oil shock of 1979. 
Growth fell sharply from 7,2% in 1978 to only 0,7% in 1980. Inflation 
almost doubled to 22,5% in 1980, from 13,2% in 1978. Unemployment 
doubled from 1,9% of the labor force in 1978 to 4% in 1981. 
PASOK won a landslide victory in October 1981, after Greece’s EEC entry, 
which it had been opposing. Ιn electoral 1981, which was also a year of 
world recession, the fiscal deficit rose from 2,6% of GDP in 1980 to 9% in 
1981. Fiscal deficits remained high throughout the 1980s, and within a 
few years public debt had exploded. High inflation also developed into a 
persistent problem for the Greek economy, accommodated by a loose 
monetary and exchange rate policy. The economy stagnated, as 
economic growth fell to almost zero for most of the 1980s and 
unemployment increased further. 
The evolution of Greek public debt is depicted in Figure 1. As can be seen 
from this chart, public debt rose from about 20% of GDP in the early 
1980s to almost 100% of GDP in the early 1990s. In addition, a large part 
of the debt of public sector entities and large government guarantees 
had not been recorded in official figures, and were only incorporated 
into official figures between 1990 and 1993.  
In the 1990s, public debt was stabilized at slightly below 100% of GDP, as 
a process of fiscal adjustment which started in 1990 was pursued 
throughout the 1990s, in the context of the convergence programs of 
the Greek economy. 
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Following the adoption of the euro, public debt rose above 100% of GDP 
in electoral 2000, and hovered around the 100% of GDP mark until 2008. 
When the international financial crisis hit Greece in late 2008, the 
government debt to GDP ratio was at 99%, versus 70% for the average of 
the Euro Area. 
During the 1980s government deficits remained persistently high. The 
governments of Andreas Papandreou followed an expansionary fiscal 
policy, financed through internal and external debt as well as inflows 
from the EEC. In the ten years between 1981 and 1990, the general 
government deficit was at more than 9% of GDP on average, something 
that had never happened before for such a long period. 
The evolution of the government deficit to GDP ratio is depicted in 
Figure 2, which also depicts the primary deficit. It is impressive how the 
deficit of the general government widened during the 1980s. Originally, 
this was due to high primary deficits, which were the initial source of 
fiscal destabilization. Primary deficits widened in the 1980s, as 
government revenue failed to keep pace with rises in primary 
expenditure. The evolution of government revenue and primary 
expenditure as a share of GDP is depicted in Figure 3. After some time, 
interest payments took over as an additional destabilizing source. The 
debt to GDP ratio increased and interest payments on the high and rising 
debt also rose relative to GDP. It is worth noting that both nominal and 
real interest rates rose in the second part of the 1980s, because of 
gradual financial liberalization. This had an additional effect on the 
deficit, but probably made debt financing easier, as Greek bonds became 
more attractive to domestic and international bondholders. 
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A second reason for the rapid rise in the government debt to GDP ratio 
during the 1980s was the slowdown in economic growth, which had an 
additional adverse effect on the process of debt accumulation (see 
Figure 4 which depicts the growth rate of GDP of Greece and the Euro 
Area). The expansionary fiscal policy failed to revive economic growth, 
and the 1980s were characterized by many years of economic stagnation 
or very low growth. 
Apart from high deficits and the slowdown in economic growth, there 
was an additional reason for the rise in the public debt to GDP ratio. 
Government guarantees for loans of both private and public enterprises 
and organizations, as well as agricultural cooperatives rose significantly 
during this period. By 1989, these guarantees had risen to 32% of GDP. 
In the next three years, half of those had to be paid out by the 
government and caused an additional increase in public debt. 
The third phase in the process of debt accumulation in Greece is the 
convergence period of the 1990s. This effectively started in 1990, when 
New Democracy under Constantine Mitsotakis was elected after three 
successive elections and two short-live coalition governments. The 
Mitsotakis government initiated a process of fiscal consolidation, mainly 
based on revenue increases, and a program of privatizations and 
liberalization of the economy. In 1992 Greece signed the Maastricht 
Treaty and its first convergence program was approved in 1993. The high 
primary deficit of 1989 was gradually reduced, and by 1994 Greece had 
achieved a primary surplus. In October 1993 early elections took place 
after the Mitsotakis government lost its parliamentary majority.  PASOK 
was reelected and remained in government throughout the rest of the 
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1990s and beyond. The PASOK government remained committed to the 
goal of preparing Greece for entry into the euro area. Early elections 
took place in 1996, and PASOK was reelected under the leadership of 
Constantine Simitis. A new convergence program had been adopted in 
late 1994, which led to Greece’s eventual admission in the euro area in 
June 2000. In the 1994-1999 period the primary surplus remained 
roughly constant relative to GDP, although both revenue and primary 
expenditure rose significantly relative to GDP. 
The 1990-999 period can be seen in retrospect as the decade of fiscal 
convergence in Greece. It spanned three governments. One ND 
government, under Constantine Mitsotakis, and two PASOK 
governments, under Andreas Papandreou and Constantine Simitis 
respectively. 
An inspection of Figures 2 and 3 reveals that we can distinguish two sub-
periods of fiscal adjustment in the decade of convergence, 1990-1999. 
During the first five years 1990-1994, fiscal adjustment was based on the 
creation of large primary surpluses. During the five years 1995-1999, 
there was no further adjustment in the primary surplus, and the further 
reduction of the general government deficit was achieved through the 
reduction of nominal interest rates that gradually adapted to 
expectations of lower inflation. Actual inflation kept falling and Greece 
was coming closer and closer to its target of participation in the euro 
area. In addition, as can be seen in Figure 4, during the 1990s the growth 
rate of GDP gradually rose, making an additional contribution to the 
stabilization of the government debt to GDP ratio. Greece was finally 
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accepted in the euro area in 2000, having marginally met the nominal 
convergence criteria of the Maastricht treaty. 
We finally turn to the fourth period, the period of Greece’s participation 
in the euro area from 2000 until 2008, when the international financial 
crisis peaked with the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
As can be seen from Figures 2 and 3, Greece’s fiscal deficit started 
widening immediately after the country’s accession to the euro area. 
The main reason was the fall in government revenue relative to GDP 
since 2000, as primary expenditure continued its inexorable rise (see 
Figure3). By 2004, the primary surplus had been transformed into a 
significant primary deficit, and the deficit of the general government had 
climbed to 7.6% of GDP, versus the 3% envisaged in the Stability and 
Growth Pact. 2004 was an election year, associated with a change in 
government. The new government of Costas Karamanlis completed the 
preparations for the Olympic Games, and afterwards embarked in a 
program of gradual fiscal consolidation and structural reforms, that 
resulted in a significant reduction of the deficit of the general 
government. Growth was strong and unemployment on a downward 
path during this period. However, fiscal slippages appeared again in 
2007, another election year, and the deficit continued its upward trend 
even after the reelection of the Karamanlis government. 2009 was a year 
of world recession and political instability in Greece, which resulted in 
early elections and the return of PASOK, under George Papandreou. The 
deficit of the general government almost doubled compared to 2008. 
When the financial crisis hit the international economy, Greece was still 
plagued by significant fiscal imbalances which worsened during the 
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crisis. Despite efforts to address the situation since the early 1990s, 
public debt had been stabilized at a high level relative to GDP, and the 
fiscal situation remained fragile, probably the most serious problem of 
the Greek economy. 
In the rest of this paper we shall provide an econometric investigation of 
the economic and political causes of these developments. As a prelude 
to this econometric investigation we shall first briefly survey the recent 
theoretical literature on the macroeconomics and politics of public debt 
accumulation. This will help inform the predictions of our model and 
provide richer interpretations of our econometric results. 
3. The Macroeconomics and Politics of Public Debt 
Accumulation 
Modern macroeconomics has a number of alternative explanations for 
the process of public debt accumulation. 
The simplest explanation relies on a representative household economy, 
in which all agents are the same. In a representative household 
economy, the theory of optimal taxation prescribes tax smoothing over 
time. Because taxes are distortionary, they should not be changed in 
order to finance temporary or cyclical changes in the government 
budget. Debt financing should be used in the case of temporary and 
exceptionally high government expenditure, such as during a war, or 
when tax receipts are temporarily low, such as during a recession (see 
Barro 1979, Lucas and Stokey 1983). Of course, permanent rises in 
government spending, such as those required for a bigger welfare state, 
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ought to be financed through higher taxes, even if taxes are 
distortionary. 
However, such dynamic optimal fiscal plans have been shown to suffer 
from the time inconsistency problem, meaning that a some point in time 
the government may have an incentive to deviate from its pre-
announced ex ante optimal tax policy (Kydland and Prescott 1977, Calvo 
1978). For example, consider a policy maker (social planner) who after a 
war (or a recession) is faced with tackling (reducing) a high public debt 
that was accumulated during the war (or the recession). The ex-ante 
optimal policy, on which the accumulation of debt was based, is to 
create surpluses by reducing expenditure and increasing revenue. 
However, she has at least three other options. First, to default on the 
debt. Second, to impose an extraordinary tax on the wealth of 
bondholders. Third, to generate unexpected inflation and monetize the 
debt. These options may appear ex post to imply smaller social costs 
than the reduction of primary government expenditure or the rise of 
other more distortionary taxes. Thus, what was optimal ex ante, before 
the accumulation of public debt, may not appear optimal ex post, after 
public debt has accumulated. This is how the time inconsistency problem 
arises. If the policy maker succumbs to the temptation of the options of 
default, a capital levy or monetization, she may lose reputation with 
bondholders and find it extremely difficult to borrow in the future. If she 
sticks to the ex-ante optimal policy, she does not lose reputation, but 
she may incur heavy social and political costs in trying to stabilize or 
reduce the debt that was accumulated. 
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Things become more complicated once we leave the world of 
representative households. If various groups of economic agents have 
conflicting objectives, then distributional and political considerations will 
arise. These richer political economy models help explain why public 
debt may also increase for reasons not related to wars or recessions. 
Consider a simple example highlighted by Alesina (1988). He assumes 
that there are three groups of agents: “rentiers” (who hold public debt), 
“entrepreneurs” (who hold equity in firms) and “workers” (who hold 
human capital). Obviously in reality there is a continuum between these 
three groups, as each household may hold different amounts of each 
particular form of capital. 
The three groups will obviously favor different solutions to the public 
debt problem. “Rentiers” will oppose default or inflation and will favor 
reductions in government expenditure or taxes on firms and workers. 
The “entrepreneurs” will favor debt default and inflation as well as taxes 
on labor. “Workers” will favor default, taxes on capital and inflation, 
provided their real wages are protected from inflation. 
The debt stabilization policies that will actually be followed will be the 
outcome of a political struggle among these three groups.  
One potential solution is offered by Downsian median voter models (see 
Downs 1957). In such models, politics converges to the preferences of 
the median voter. If the median voter is a “worker”, a democratic 
government will tend to favor default, capital taxation and inflation. If 
“rentiers” and “entrepreneurs” prevail, in the sense of the median voter 
model, labor taxes will be increased and social expenditure reduced. 
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However, median voter equilibria exist under very restrictive conditions. 
If every group can block the preferences of the other two, but is unable 
to impose its own preferred solution, then public debt will not be tackled 
and will continue accumulating well after the war or the initial recession. 
Such models provide an explanation as to why we have been observing a 
bias towards excessive fiscal deficits and rises in debt to GDP ratios in 
peacetime. Governments are reluctant and hesitant in taking decisions 
that would stabilize public debt, for fear of alienating one or more of the 
political groups that stand to lose from an adjustment program. Such 
decisions are even more difficult in electoral periods. Models of this 
form are analyzed in the new political economy literature. 
Let us first consider electoral factors. The basic idea is that before the 
election, decision makers attempt to use fiscal policy in order to 
positively influence voters and thus maximize their chance of staying in 
power. This is called the opportunistic or electoral incentive. Contrary to 
what is generally believed, providing theoretical interpretations of such 
electoral fiscal cycles is not straightforward under the assumption of 
rational expectations. The question that arises is why rational voters 
would want to reward a government that causes a pre-election budget 
cycle, when they know that this is for opportunistic reasons. Rogoff and 
Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) provide a neat theoretical explanation 
based on asymmetric information between governments and voters and 
how governments can exploit this asymmetry. In their model the 
effectiveness of government cannot be directly observed by voters. 
Voters simply observe an electoral improvement in their economic 
condition, which may result from an increase in government spending or 
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tax cuts. They do not know during the election whether this 
improvement is artificial and temporary or the result of an effective 
economic policy. Voters will thus rationally attribute part of the 
economic improvement they observe to the effectiveness of 
government policy, and thus the popularity of the government will 
increase. Consequently, the ruling party has every incentive to increase 
public spending and reduce taxes before the election in order to 
maximize its popularity. Models of asymmetric information can thus 
explain the expansion of fiscal deficits during elections. Even if voters 
know that the government has an electoral incentive to reduce taxes 
and increase public spending, they rationally attribute only part of the 
economic improvement observed to the opportunism of incumbent 
governments, while another part is attributed to the effectiveness of 
government policy. 
The model of Rogoff and Sibert to electoral cycles has been enriched by 
the introduction of partisan differences. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and 
Persson and Svensson (1989), introduced partisan differences and the 
possibility of issuing debt, in order to develop a theory of electoral cycles 
based on the strategic use of debt. 
The basic idea of models based on partisan differences is that policy 
makers belong to political parties which have different ideological 
premises and which strive to meet the aspirations of different 
constituencies. Thus, a “socialist” government would be aiming for a 
larger public sector than a “conservative” or “free market” government. 
“Socialists” would tend to favor more the role of the public sector, while 
“free market” parties would tend to rely more on the private sector. 
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“Socialists” would be less averse to high income and wealth taxes than 
“free market” advocates, having a stronger faith in the redistributive role 
of taxes.  This somewhat stylized and over-simplified distinction is not 
far from the preferences of voters and parties in most mixed economies, 
and is a key characteristic of partisan models. 
Every government knows that, with some probability, voters will replace 
it at some future election. If it can the control a "state variable", such as 
public debt, it will try to use it strategically to influence the future 
choices of its successors in the direction of its own preferences or in the 
direction of the preferences of its constituents. Of course, in order for 
this to be possible government debt must not be neutral. For example, if 
taxation is distortionary, a change in the time path of public debt will 
have permanent effects on the economy, and even effects that cannot 
be fully reversed by future governments. 
Persson and Svensson (1989) show that an increase in public debt from a 
"conservative" government can be an equilibrium strategy, as it binds its 
successors to restrain primary public spending in the future. Thus, if a 
“conservative” government were to cut taxes today and increase public 
debt, this puts pressure on its “socialist” successors to limit future 
primary expenditure along with a future increase in taxes. The 
intertemporal distribution of the tax burden may not be optimal, but the 
future path of fiscal policy will be nearer to the objectives of the 
“conservative” incumbent. When the ideological differences between 
political parties are large, then there is a trend for an increase in 
government debt, even by “conservative” governments. 
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A related idea of Tabellini and Alesina (1990) is that governments 
disagree on the composition of public spending. Again we have an 
increasing trend in public deficits as the government borrows to increase 
the type of spending it prefers, knowing that future spending cuts or tax 
increases to service the debt will come from everywhere. 
Another strand of the literature focuses on the fact that elections result 
in “myopic” behavior on the part of incumbent governments. If 
governments do not care about the state of the economy in case they 
are not reelected, in election years they will be more reluctant to incur 
the costs associated with adjusting government expenditure and taxes, 
as they discount the future benefits in terms of lower public debt more 
heavily. Lockwood, Philippopoulos and Snell (1996) and Lockwood, 
Philippopoulos and Tzavalis (2001) set up and estimate models of this 
nature, based on Barro (1979). Their model combines both electoral and 
partisan factors. Their models are based on the shorter horizon that 
governments have at election times, which result in a weakening of the 
incentive to stabilize public debt. The model presented in the present 
paper derives directly from theirs, but extends it to allow for additional 
electoral effects of the Rogoff and Sibert variety.  
A related set of considerations applies for models that directly try to 
explain why governments delay adopting effective fiscal adjustment 
programs. See Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Velasco (1999). 
This literature concludes that political institutions matter for the 
accumulation of public debt. Elections, political instability and wide 
ideological differences between the main political parties, result in 
greater deficits and debt. A further significant insight from this literature 
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is that binding one’s hand, through participation in international 
institutions that limit the use of deficits and debts in financing 
government expenditure will result in more effective fiscal adjustment. 
The Maastricht treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact of the euro area 
can in this sense be seen as commitment mechanisms for effective fiscal 
adjustment
2
. 
4. A Model of Macroeconomics, Politics and Debt Stabilization 
In this section we set up a model of the macroeconomics and politics of 
debt stabilization. The model is a linear quadratic variant of the model of 
Barro (1979), as it has been generalized to include partisan and electoral 
factors by Lockwood, Philippopoulos and Snell (1996) and Lockwood, 
Philippopoulos and Tzavalis (2001). 
Our starting point is the process of public debt accumulation. To the 
extent that there is a government deficit, public debt increases to 
finance this deficit. The relationship between deficits and debt 
accumulation is given by,  
Bt − Bt−1 = rBt−1 + Gt − Tt         (1) 
where, B is public debt, r is the real interest rate of government bonds, G 
is the primary expenditure of the general government, and T is total 
                                                 
2
 The literature on the politico-economic causes of high deficits and debts grew 
exponentially in the 1990s. An early survey is in Alesina and Perotti (1995). A comprehensive 
analysis of the main models is in Persson and Tabellini (2000). See among others the papers 
by Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Aghion and Bolton (1990), 
Alesina and Drazen (1991), Tabellini (1991), Velasco (1999). Many cross country studies have 
also emerged, focusing on the association between political institutions and debt. See 
among others Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). 
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revenue of the general government. All variables are defined in real 
terms. 
Equation (1) simply states that the government deficit leads to a rise in 
government debt. The government deficit consists of the difference 
between total government expenditure and total government revenue. 
Total government expenditure consists of interest payments on the debt 
plus primary (i.e. net of interest) government expenditure. 
Dividing equation (1) by GDP, we get the corresponding equation for the 
evolution of the government debt to GDP ratio. 
bt − bt−1 =
r − γ
1+ γ bt−1 + gt − τ t         (2) 
γ is the growth rate of GDP, b is the government debt to GDP ratio, g is 
the ratio of primary government expenditure to GDP and τ is the ratio of 
total government revenue (taxes) to GDP. 
From (2), the government debt to GDP ratio follows, 
bt = Rbt−1 + gt −τ t          (3) 
Where  
R = 1+ r − γ
1+ γ  
If the real interest rate on government debt exceeds the GDP growth 
rate, R will be greater than unity, and the debt accumulation process will 
be unstable. One way to stabilize the process would be for the ratio of 
primary government expenditure to GDP and/or the ratio of total 
government revenue to GDP to react to the size of the government debt 
to GDP ratio. For example, if primary government expenditure is 
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reduced relative to GDP and if total revenue is increased relative to GDP 
as government debt increases, then the debt accumulation process can 
be stabilized. We shall term this the debt stabilization objective, as this 
ensures that debt is sustainable. This will turn out to be one of the key 
objectives of fiscal policy in our model. 
We assume that there are two political parties, Conservative (c) and 
Socialist (s). In an election year, the incumbent party has an exogenous 
probability 0<q<1 of being reelected for the following year. Therefore in 
an election year there is uncertainty over whether the party will remain 
in power for the next period. 
The two political parties have different targets for primary government 
and taxes, which are based on their ideological preferences. The 
“conservative” party generally aims for lower government spending and 
taxes than the “socialist” party. The per period loss function of party 
i=(c,s) is given by, 
Lt
i
= θ i gt − gti ( j)
_



2
+ τ t −τ t
i ( j)
_



2
 when in government   (4) 
Lt
i
= 0      when in opposition 
where θ is the weight given by each party to deviations in primary 
government expenditure from target, relative to deviations in tax and 
revenue targets. g-bar and τ-bar are exogenous party specific targets for 
primary government expenditure and taxes respectively, and j=(n,e) is 
an index of non-election and election years respectively. In line with the 
political economy literature we shall assume that socialists (s) aim for 
higher primary government expenditure and taxes than conservatives 
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(c). Along with Lockwood et al (1996) we also assume that socialists may 
assign higher costs to deviations from their expenditure targets, as they 
attach a higher weight to government expenditure. In addition, both 
types of administration are assumed to have higher primary expenditure 
targets and lower revenue targets in election years than in non-election 
years. This latter effect we shall term the Rogoff-Sibert effect. 
gt
s
_
( j) ≥ gtc ( j)
_
,  
gt
i
_
(e) ≥ gti
_
(n) 
τ t
s
_
( j) ≥ τ tc
_
( j)           (5) 
τ t
i
_
(e) ≤ τ ti
_
(n) 
θ s ≥ θ c  
In addition, we shall assume that the targets for primary government 
expenditure and taxes relative to GDP for both parties, are consistent 
with a target government debt to GDP ratio. From (3), this implies that 
the target debt to GDP ratio for each party solves the stochastic 
difference equation, 
b
_
t
i
= g
_
t
i
− τ
_
t
i
+ Rb
_
t−1
i
    , i=c,s        (6) 
with b0 given. We assume that b0 is too high, in the sense that the party 
in power cannot achieve its expenditure and revenue targets 
simultaneously. (6) imposes an intertemporal constraint on the targets 
of political parties for primary expenditure and taxes. 
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To simplify the notation in the subsequent analysis, we shall define 
primary government expenditure, taxes and government debt as 
deviations from targets. We thus define, 
gt
i
^
= gt − gt
i
_


  ,  
τ t
i
^
= τ t − τ t
i
_


 , 
bti
^
= bt − bti
_


      (7) 
We shall assume that the party in government tries to minimize the 
present value of discounted future losses from deviations from its 
primary expenditure and revenue targets, and that initial debt is too 
high to allow it to achieve its targets perfectly. 
Thus, the problem of the incumbent government is to minimize 
L(i) = δ i,t−1Lti Itt=1
∞
∑            (8) 
subject to the debt accumulation equation (2). δ
i
 is the discount factor 
and is assumed to be less than unity. We assume that δ
c
 ≧ δ
s
 , i.e that 
socialist governments, being more focused on current government 
consumption and the distribution of income, may discount the future 
more heavily than conservative governments. The index variable I takes 
the value of 1 when party i is in government and 0 when the party is 
delegated to the opposition. 
We solve for Markov-perfect equilibria in which the optimal policies are 
functions of the current state variable. Since the model is linear 
quadratic, we focus on linear Markov strategies.
3
 
                                                 
3
 It is worth noting that Lockwood et al (1996, 2001) assumed the same discount factor for 
both political parties. 
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The solution of the problem is characterized by the following pair of 
Bellman equations. 
βni b
^
t−1




2
= min θ i (g
^
t )2 + (τ
^
t )2 +δ iβei b
^
t




2


  in an non-election year (n)
           (9) 
βei b
^
t−1




2
= min θ i (g
^
t )2 + (τ
^
t )2 + δ iqβni b
^
t




2


  in an election year (e) 
where, βni b
^
t−1
2
,βei b
^
t−1
2
are the present value of losses to party i in the 
respective e and n years and q is the reelection probability of the 
incumbent. 
From the minimization of the Bellman equations subject to the debt 
accumulation equation (3), we get the following Markov strategies. 
g
^
t = −λ ji Rb
^
t−1         (10a) 
τ
^
t = θ iλ ji Rb
^
t−1         (10b) 
where j = n,e , i = c,l  and, 
0 ≤ λni ≡
δ iβei
θ i +δ iβei (1+θ i ) < 1 and 
0 ≤ λei ≡
δ iqβni
θ i +δ iβni (1+θ i ) < 1  (11) 
Substituting the Markov strategies (10) in the debt accumulation 
equation (3) in deviation form, we get 
b
^
t = 1− λ ji (1+θ i )( ) Rb^ t−1        (12) 
The Markov strategies (10) define the equilibrium reaction functions of 
primary government expenditure and total government revenue to 
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inherited debt. The characteristics of the equilibrium have been 
analyzed by Lockwood et al (1996) and can be summarized as follows: 
First, the two policy instruments, primary expenditures and tax revenue 
are used to stabilize the government debt to GDP ratio. The primary 
expenditure to GDP ratio is a negative function of inherited debt, while 
the government revenue to GDP ratio is a positive function of inherited 
debt. We shall term this characteristic of the political equilibrium, the 
debt stabilization effect. However, this feedback debt stabilization policy 
depends on political factors. 
Second, for both parties the primary expenditure to GDP ratio is higher 
in election years than in non-election years. The proof is in Appendix A 
of Lockwood et al (1996), who show that λe<λn for both parties. As a 
result, debt stabilization is weaker in election years. In election years the 
incumbent optimally resorts to excess spending and lower tax revenue 
relative to non-election years. The reason is that, with a positive 
probability, she will be in opposition after the election and will not have 
to face the consequences of higher deficits until she is reelected. We 
shall term this the electoral effect. If the probability of reelection of the 
incumbent is zero, then the debt stabilization effect disappears in 
election years. In our model, we shall allow for an additional Rogoff 
Sibert electoral effect, through the government targets for primary 
expenditure and revenue, which may differ between election and non-
election years. 
Third, there are partisan effects. Per unit of accumulated debt, both 
primary expenditure and taxes will be higher under a socialist 
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administration, both in election and non-election years. From (7) and 
(10a,b), it follows that, 
gt = g
_
t
i
( j) − λ ji R bt−1 − b
_
t
i


        (12a) 
τ t = τ
_
t
i
( j) +θ iλ ji R bt−1 − b
_
t
i


        (12b) 
Lockwood et al (1996) show that λ
s 
< λ
l
 and that θ
s
λ
s
 > θ
l
λ
l
 , both in 
election and non-election years. This follows from the assumption that 
θ, the cost of deviating from the expenditure target relative to deviating 
from the revenue target, is assumed to be higher for socialist 
administrations. However, they also argue that the two partisan effects, 
on expenditure and taxes cancel each other out, and that there is no 
partisan effect on the reaction of the primary deficit, or debt itself, to 
accumulated debt. 
By the assumption (5) that socialist administrations have higher 
expenditure and revenue targets than conservative ones, and that both 
types of administration have higher primary expenditure targets and 
lower revenue targets in election years, one would also expect possible 
additional partisan and electoral effects through the expenditure and 
revenue targets. 
Finally, in our model there is a third potential partisan effect through the 
discount factor δ. If socialists discount the future more heavily than 
conservatives, then it follows that λ
s 
< λ
l  
even in the case where θ is the 
same for both parties. In this case, one expects a higher feedback 
coefficient in conservative administrations. 
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By subtracting (12b) from (12a), the reaction function for the primary 
deficit will take the form, 
dt = gt −τ t = g
_
t
i
( j) − τ
_
t
i
( j)



− λ ji 1+θ i( ) R bt−1 − b_ ti

    (12c) 
By estimating (12c), the reaction function for the primary deficit, we can 
identify most of the effects that we have highlighted. A negative 
coefficient on the lagged debt to GDP ratio identifies the stabilization 
effect. A smaller absolute value of the coefficient in election years 
identifies the electoral effect. And finally, a different coefficient for the 
type of administration identifies the potential net partisan effect. The 
additional political effects through the target variables can also be 
estimated through appropriate specification of the government targets. 
5. Econometric Evidence: Greece 1975-2009 
We now turn to econometric estimates of the model. As a first step we 
investigate the statistical properties of the data. 
5.1 Data 
We use annual data for Greece, from the Spring 2010 Statistical Annex of 
the European Economy of the Commission of the European Union. The 
exact series are reproduced in the Data Appendix.
4
 
                                                 
4
 In the Autumn of 2010 Eurostat and the Greek government redefined the scope of the 
general government to include public enterprises. Data since then include the additional 
deficits and debt of public enterprises as well. However, the redefined government finance 
data have only been extended backwards to 2006. The data we use in this investigation do 
not incorporate this redefinition, in order to concentrate on a consistently defined version of 
the general government for the whole 1975-2009 period. 
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Our main data set consists of five series: general government gross debt 
(bt), primary (i.e. net of interest payments) expenditure of the general 
government (gt), total revenue of the general government (τt), the 
primary (i.e. net of interest payments) deficit of the general government 
(dt=gt-τt), and the debt multiplier Rt, which depends on the difference 
between the real interest rate of government debt and the GDP growth 
rate (as in (3)). All series apart from R are shares of GDP at current 
market prices. We also use the rate of growth of GDP in the euro area, 
as an exogenous measure of the state of the economy. Greece is a small 
open economy and its economic cycle is strongly synchronized with the 
rest of the euro area.
5
 The state of the economy is expected to affect 
primary expenditure and revenue relative to GDP, either through the 
operation of automatic stabilizers, or through discretionary government 
actions to stabilize the economy. 
In Table 2 we present unit root tests for our six main series. At the 
conventional 5% level, the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected 
for any of the main series apart from R. We also present cointegration 
tests, which suggest that the series are cointegrated at conventional 
significance levels. In fact, if one calculates the tests conditional on 
dummy variables for elections, the party in power and the post 1992 
convergence period associated with the euro, there are not only one, 
but up to three cointegrating equations. 
                                                 
5
 See Figure 4, which depicts the rate of growth of GDP in Greece and the euro area. 
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Thus, estimating the model assuming a deterministic trend would be 
appropriate, and the set of estimates reported here assumes a 
deterministic trend.
6
 
5.2 Econometric Specification 
It is worth noting that the main predictions of the model can be tested 
from estimates of the adjustment equation for the primary deficit (12c). 
However, in order to estimate all the parameters we need to estimate 
the primary expenditure and revenue equations (12a), (12b) jointly. This 
will allow us to draw full conclusions about the fiscal adjustment process 
in Greece. 
A problem that remains to be addressed is the specification of the target 
variables for primary expenditure and total revenue of the two political 
parties. Given the properties of the data, we shall assume that the 
targets have a deterministic trend, and also depend on political factors, 
such as the identity of the party in power and the incidence of elections. 
In addition we shall allow for effects from the Maastricht treaty, which 
Greece signed in 1992, and the Stability and Growth Pact of the euro 
area, in order to test for their effectiveness as political commitment 
mechanisms. With its emphasis on the 3% target for government deficits 
and the 60% target for the government debt to GDP ratio, the 
                                                 
6
 We have also estimated the model assuming stochastic trends. This amounts to estimating 
the model using the variables in first differences, as in Lockwood, Philippopoulos and 
Tzavalis (2001). The econometric estimates are available upon request. Our main 
conclusions are not affected, though there are some subtle differences in the estimates. 
Given that cointegration cannot be rejected and the standard error of estimate of our 
deterministic trend equations is much smaller, we have more confidence in the results 
reported here, especially as level effects are thrown out once one uses the variables in first 
differences. 
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Maastricht treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact imposed additional 
constraints on government targets. Thus we assume, 
g
_
t
i
( j) = g0 +φ1gt−1 +ζ11Pt +ζ12Et −ζ13M t +ζ14t     (13a) 
τ
_
t
i
( j) = τ 0 +φ2τ t−1 +ζ 21Pt −ζ 22Et +ζ 23M t +ζ 24t     (13b) 
b
_
t
i
= b0 +φ3bt−1 −ζ 33M t        (13c) 
g0 , τ0
 
and b0 are constant parameters.  Pt, Et and Mt are zero-one (0,1) 
dummy variables. Pt (for Party) takes the value of 1 for a socialist 
government and 0 for a conservative government. Et (for Election) takes 
the value of 1 in election years and 0 in non-election years. Mt (for 
Maastricht) takes the value of 1 in the post-1992 Maastricht treaty and 
euro area period and zero before that. φ1, φ2 and φ3 are parameters that 
measure “hysteresis”, i.e state dependence in the government targets. It 
is assumed that φ1, φ2 and φ3 < 1. The ζ parameters are presumed to be 
positive and embody our three political assumptions: first, that socialist 
administrations have higher targets for government expenditure and 
taxes, second, that all governments have higher primary expenditure 
targets and lower revenue targets in election years (the Rogoff-Sibert 
effect), and, third, that the Maastricht treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact were effective commitment mechanisms for Greek 
governments inducing them to lower their primary expenditure and debt 
targets, and raise their revenue targets (the commitment mechanism 
effect). t is an exogenous time trend on primary expenditure and 
revenue. In (13c) we have assumed that there are neither partisan, nor 
electoral effects on debt targets, and that neither party had a growing 
target for the debt to GDP ratio. 
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Substituting (13a,b,c) in (12a,b,c), we end up with, 
gt = g0 + λ ji Rb0 − λ ji (1−φ3)Rbt−1 +φ1gt−1 +ζ11Pt +ζ12Et − ζ13 +ζ 33λ ji R( ) M t +ζ14t     (14a) 
τ t = τ 0 −θ iλ ji Rb0 +θ iλ ji (1−φ3)Rbt−1 +φ2τ t−1 +ζ 21Pt −ζ 22Et + ζ 23 +ζ 33θ iλ ji R( ) M t +ζ 24t (14b) 
dt = d0 + (1+θ i )λ ji Rb0 − (1+θ i )λ ji (1−φ3)Rbt−1 +φ1dt−1 +ζ1Pt +ζ 2Et −ζ 3M t +ζ 4t   (14c) 
where, d0 = g0 − τ 0 , ζ1 = ζ11 −ζ 21 , ζ 2 = ζ12 +ζ 22 > 0 , ζ 3 = ζ13 +ζ 23 +ζ 33(1+θ i )λ ji R > 0 . 
In (14c) we have imposed the testable assumption that the hysteresis 
coefficient is the same for both primary expenditure and revenue 
targets, i.e. that φ1=φ2. 
In our econometric estimates we shall consider generalized versions of 
(14a,b,c) in which the state of the business cycle is also allowed to affect 
the evolution of the primary expenditure, revenue and primary deficit to 
GDP ratios. This could be either through the operation of automatic 
stabilizers, or through additional motives to use discretionary fiscal 
policy. Since Greece is a small open economy and its economic cycle is 
strongly synchronized with that of the euro area economies, we shall use 
the rate of growth of GDP in the euro area as an exogenous measure of 
the state of the business cycle. 
Thus, our final econometric specifications take the form, 
gt = g0 + λ ji Rb0 − λ ji (1−φ3)Rbt−1 +φ1gt−1 +ζ11Pt +ζ12Et − ζ13 +ζ 33λ ji R( )M t +ζ14t − σ gyt* + v1t  (15a) 
τ t = τ 0 −θ iλ ji Rb0 +θ iλ ji (1−φ3)Rbt−1 +φ2τ t−1 +ζ 21Pt −ζ 22Et + ζ 23 +ζ 33θ iλ ji R( ) M t +ζ 24t +σ τ yt* + v2t  (15b) 
dt = d0 + (1+θ i )λ ji Rb0 − (1+θ i )λ ji (1−φ3)Rbt−1 +φ1dt−1 +ζ1Pt +ζ 2Et −ζ 3M t +ζ 4t − (σ g + σ τ )yt* + v1t − v2t  (15c) 
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where σg, στ >0 measure the impact of the state of the European 
economy on the primary expenditure to GDP ratio and the government 
revenue to GDP ratio respectively. y* is the rate of growth of GDP in the 
euro area. Thus, σg measures by how much the primary expenditure to 
GDP ratio falls, following a one percent increase in the rate of growth of 
euro area GDP (and vice versa), and στ measures the extent to which the 
total revenue to GDP ratio rises following a one percent increase in the 
euro area growth rate (and vice versa). v1, and v2  are i.i.d disturbances. 
5.3 Econometric Estimates and Tests 
In what follows we shall first present estimates of the reaction function 
(15c) for the primary deficit, as it is the primary deficit that drives the 
process of government debt accumulation. An additional advantage of 
estimating (15c) is that we can rely on single equation methods. 
We shall subsequently also present joint estimates of the reaction 
functions for primary expenditure and total government revenue (15a) 
and (15b), in order to identify whether the adjustment of the primary 
deficit takes place mainly through primary expenditure or taxes and in 
order to identify those parameters that cannot be identified from the 
primary deficit reaction function. 
Estimates for the reaction function (15c) for the primary deficit is 
presented in Table 3. The estimates have been obtained by Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) and t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity 
consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses below the 
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estimated parameters. A number of diagnostics are also reported, which 
do not suggest misspecification problems in the estimated regressions.
7
  
In order to estimate the parameters λ which are assumed to differ 
between socialist and conservative governments, and between election 
and non-election years, we have interacted lagged debt to GDP with the 
partisan and electoral (0,1) dummy variables. We have thus created the 
following variables: 
bn,t−1
c
= (1− Pt )(1− Et )bt−1   for a non-election year with a conservative government 
bn,t−1
s
= Pt (1− Et )bt−1  for a non-election year with a socialist government 
be,t−1
c
= (1− Pt )Etbt−1  for an election year with a conservative incumbent  
be,t−1
s
= PtEtbt−1    for an election year with a socialist incumbent 
We have also created lagged debt to GDP variables to test for potential 
purely electoral and purely partisan effects. 
bn,t−1 = (1− Et )bt−1   for a non-election year 
be,t−1 = Etbt−1   for an election year 
bt−1c = (1− Pt )bt−1  for a conservative government 
bt−1s = Ptbt−1   for a socialist government 
                                                 
7
 R
2
 is the centered coefficient of determination, T-N is the number of degrees of freedom, 
where T is the number of observations and N the number of estimated parameteres. SSR is 
the sum of squared residuals, s the standard error of estimate and DW the Durbin Watson 
statistic for first order residual autocorrelation. AUT is the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for 
residual autocorrelation up to second order, HET is the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey LM test for 
residual heteroskedasticity and ARCH is the Engle test for autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity. The F-form of these diagnostics is reported. NORM is the χ
2
 Jarque-Bera 
normality (skewness kurtosis) test on the residuals. 
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One can use the purely electoral variables to impose the restriction that 
there are no partisan effects, and the purely partisan variables to impose 
the restriction that there are no electoral effects. 
The main conclusions from the estimates in Table 3 can be summarized 
as follows: 
First, there does seem to exist a statistically significant trend in the ratio 
of the primary deficit to GDP. Other things equal, the primary deficit 
rises by between 0.3 and 0.4 of a percentage point of GDP every year. 
This is indicated by the estimated trend coefficient. 
Second, there does seem to be a statistically significant negative 
reaction of the primary deficit to the government debt to GDP ratio (see 
Table 3, columns 1 to 4). A higher government debt to GDP ratio does 
cause a reduction of the primary deficit relative to GDP in the following 
year. Thus, one of the main predictions of our model, the debt 
stabilization motive appears to be supported. The estimated debt 
stabilization reaction is estimated at between 7-8% of a change in the 
debt to GDP ratio, and is rather weak (see columns 2 and 4). 
Furthermore, the debt stabilization motive appears to be independent of 
the identity of the party in power, or elections. In columns 1 and 3 we 
have estimated the model under the assumption that the debt 
stabilization motive can differ according to the identity of the party in 
power and between election and non-election years. The parameter 
estimates suggest similar reactions for both parties and similar reactions 
for election and non-election years. In columns 2 and 4 we have imposed 
the restriction that the debt stabilization motive is the same for both 
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parties and for election and non-election years. The restriction cannot be 
rejected at conventional significance levels. 
Third, there seems to be a relatively strong and statistically significant 
negative impact from the state of the euro area economy on the primary 
government deficit of Greece relative to its GDP. In periods when euro 
area growth is strong, Greece’s primary deficit is lower than in periods of 
weak euro area growth. A one percent increase in the rate of growth of 
euro area GDP causes Greece’s primary deficit to fall by around 0.6 of a 
percentage point of GDP. This may simply reflect the operation of strong 
“automatic stabilizers” as, for a small open economy such as Greece’s, 
high external growth causes high domestic growth, which in turn results 
in higher tax revenues and lower primary expenditures for 
unemployment benefits and other categories of social expenditure. 
Alternatively, this effect could be interpreted in terms of a 
countercyclical discretionary use of fiscal policy by Greek governments. 
It is worth noting however that this alternative explanation is not the 
most plausible one, as purely domestic macroeconomic developments 
do not appear to have affected the evolution of the primary deficit to 
GDP ratio. When lagged domestic GDP growth, inflation, unemployment 
and the current account were added to the regression, they did not turn 
out to be statistically significant, suggesting that the authorities in 
Greece have not been using discretionary fiscal policy to counteract 
macroeconomic fluctuations. 
Fourth, there appear to be no partisan effects on the primary deficit. The 
estimates in column 1 and 3 suggest that there are no discernible 
partisan effects on government targets for the primary deficit, as the 
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coefficient on the socialist party dummy variable is not statistically 
significant. 
Fifth, there are significant electoral effects. On the basis of the estimates 
in Table 3 one would not be able to reject the hypothesis of significantly 
higher primary deficits in election years. The feedback coefficients to 
government debt do not depend on elections, but the government 
targets for the primary deficit do appear to depend on elections. Other 
things equal, the primary deficit is higher by between 1.5 and 3 
percentage points of GDP in an election year. The models of Rogoff and 
Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) provide an explanation for such an 
effect, based on the attempts of governments to improve their 
reelection probability by increasing primary expenditure and reducing 
taxes. Given that elections in Greece have taken place once every three 
years (12 elections in 35 years of data), elections have resulted in an 
average primary deficit to GDP ratio which is higher by between half and 
a full percentage point of GDP. 
Finally, the restrictions implied for the fiscal policy of Greece by the 
Maastricht treaty and subsequent participation in the euro area appear 
to have had a significant negative effect on the primary deficit. The 
estimated coefficient on the Maastricht dummy variable suggests that in 
the post-1992 period the average primary deficit of Greece has been 
lower by between 4 and 5 percentage points of GDP, compared to what 
it would have been otherwise. 
To conclude, on the basis of the estimates in Table 3, there has been a 
statistically significant but relatively weak debt stabilization behavior by 
Greek governments of both political parties. This was concentrated in 
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non-election years, as in election years the primary deficit increased by 
between 1.5 and 3 percentage points of GDP. Budgetary policy in Greece 
was adversely influenced by the incidence of elections. The post-
Maastricht treaty period, when Greece adopted convergence and 
stability and growth programs, resulted in significantly lower primary 
deficit to GDP ratios, compared to what would have happened 
otherwise. 
We next turn to the joint estimates of the reaction functions for primary 
expenditure and government revenue in Table 4. The estimates have 
been obtained by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. 
Our main findings from the estimates of the reaction function for the 
primary deficit are confirmed from these estimates. A number of 
interesting additional conclusions emerge from these separate 
estimates. 
The first additional conclusion is that the trend increase in the primary 
deficit to GDP ratio is due to rises in primary expenditure. Primary 
expenditure rises by about 0.4 of a percentage point of GDP per annum, 
while the total revenue to GDP ratio displays almost no trend. Increases 
in primary expenditure have thus been the driving force of higher 
primary deficits. 
The second additional conclusion is that the negative feedback of the 
primary deficit to inherited debt is mostly due to government revenue. 
Of the roughly 7% reaction of the primary deficit to inherited debt, 
about 6% is due to the reaction of government revenue, and only about 
  37 
1% is due to the reaction of primary expenditure. Primary expenditure 
has scarcely been used for debt stabilization purposes. The implicit 
estimate of θ, the relative cost of deviations from expenditure targets 
relative to deviations from the revenue target in our model, is about 6, 
which suggests that Greek governments have found it 6 times more 
difficult to reduce primary expenditure for fiscal adjustment purposes 
than to increase revenue. 
The third additional conclusion is that the state of the euro area 
economy has roughly equal effects on the primary expenditure to GDP 
ratio and to total revenue relative to GDP. The effect of a one percent 
increase in the growth rate of euro area GDP is about 0.3 of a 
percentage point of GDP for both the primary expenditure to GDP ratio 
and for the total revenue to GDP ratio. Thus, other things equal, a fall in 
the growth rate of euro area GDP by one percent, results in an increase 
in Greece’s primary deficit to GDP ratio by 0.6% of GDP, about half of it 
coming from higher primary expenditure relative to GDP and another 
half of it coming from lower government revenue. 
The fourth additional conclusion is that there are significant partisan 
effects on the primary expenditure targets. Socialist administrations 
appear to be associated with primary expenditure which is higher by 
about 1% of GDP compared with conservative administrations. They are 
also associated with higher government revenue of less than one 
percent of GDP, but this latter effect is not statistically significant at 
conventional significance levels. In any case, this effect is not statistically 
different from the 1% effect of primary expenditure either. Thus, one 
would not be able to reject the hypothesis that although socialist 
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administrations have been associated with higher primary expenditure, 
they have not been necessarily associated with higher primary deficits, 
because they have been prepared to target higher tax revenue. 
Our fifth conclusion concerns the electoral effects. It appears that the 
positive electoral effects on the primary deficit that we have identified 
are almost entirely due to primary expenditure. In electoral years, 
primary expenditure rises by about 1.4% of GDP on average, while 
government revenue is scarcely reduced. The coefficient of the electoral 
dummy variable is statistically significant in the primary expenditure 
reaction function, but not in the revenue reaction function. 
The final conclusion concerns the Maastricht treaty and euro 
participation effects. Roughly 60% of the reduction in the average 
primary deficit in the post-Maastricht period was due to increases in 
government revenue and only 40% to reductions in primary expenditure. 
This is consistent with our previous finding that Greek governments have 
mainly used revenue and not expenditure for debt stabilization 
purposes. 
Our findings can thus be summarized as follows: 
First, primary government expenditure in Greece has been rising faster 
that government revenue, and this is the main proximate cause of the 
rise in Greece’s government debt. The trend increase in primary 
government expenditure was at about 0.4 of a percentage point of GDP 
per annum, while the trend increase in total revenue was only 0.05 
percentage point of GDP per annum. This trend increase was 
independent of which party was in government. 
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Second, Greek governments have displayed debt stabilizing behavior 
during non-election years. In election years, there appears to have been 
an average increase of primary deficits by about 1.5 percentage points of 
GDP. The increase in primary deficits in election years was mainly due to 
increases in primary expenditure and not to reductions in taxes and 
government revenue. 
Fourth, the preferred instrument of debt stabilization in Greece has 
been increases in government revenue rather than reductions in primary 
expenditure. However, due to tax smoothing considerations, this debt 
stabilization reaction has been rather weak. 
Fifth, the Maastricht treaty and participation in the euro area resulted in 
a significant reduction in Greece’s primary deficit to GDP ratio. This 
reduction was achieved mostly through increases in government 
revenue, the preferred fiscal adjustment instrument of Greek 
governments, but primary expenditure reductions also played a 
significant part. 
Finally, as expected, fluctuations in euro area GDP growth have had a 
significant impact on Greek primary deficits. A one percent rise in euro 
area GDP results in a fall in the Greek    primary deficit by about 0.6 of a 
percentage point of GDP. The impact is roughly equally divided between 
reductions in primary expenditure and increases in revenue. 
The model thus identifies the main economic and political determinants 
that have contributed to the accumulation of Greek debt as the trend 
increase in primary government expenditure, the weak debt stabilizing 
reactions of tax revenue, due to tax smoothing, and elections. The rules 
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of the Maastricht treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact contributed 
to lower primary deficits after 1992, but their impact was just sufficient 
to stabilize Greece’s government debt at around 100% of GDP. 
Our findings can also help explain the destabilization of Greece’s public 
finances in 2009. 2009 was a year in which Greece’s primary deficit 
increased by 5.6 percentage points of GDP, from 3.2% of GDP in 2008 to 
8.8% of GDP in 2009. About half of this increase (2.8 percentage points 
of GDP) can be explained by the recession in the euro area. Euro area 
GDP growth was -4.4% in 2009, versus 0.3% in 2008. 1.5 percentage 
points can be explained by the electoral increase in primary expenditure, 
and the remainder through hysteresis effects, as the primary deficit had 
also increased in 2008 for related economic (the slowdown in euro area 
GDP growth) and political reasons (the election of 2007). Thus, the 
economic and political factors highlighted in our econometric model can 
help explain the largest part of the recent destabilization of Greece’s 
public finances. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper contains an econometric investigation of the macroeconomic 
and political factors that contributed to Greece’s excessive debt 
accumulation and its failure to adequately address its fiscal imbalances, 
from the restoration of democracy in 1974 till the crisis of 2009. Given 
Greece’s turbulent fiscal experience, Greece provides an ideal test case 
for political economy theories of debt accumulation. 
The econometric investigation is based on a model in which two political 
parties alternate in power, and in which governments choose primary 
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expenditure and taxes to minimize deviations from politically 
determined expenditure and tax targets, subject to a debt accumulation 
equation. The model predicts a political equilibrium in which primary 
expenditure and taxes follow feedback rules which go in the direction of 
stabilizing the debt to GDP ratio. However, this stabilization incentive is 
weaker in election years. The model also predicts potential partisan 
differences in the evolution of primary expenditure and taxes, due to the 
different preferences of political parties. 
Estimates of government reaction functions to public debt for the period 
1975-2009 suggest a statistically significant, but weak, stabilizing 
reaction of primary deficits to public debt. 
This stabilizing reaction almost disappears in election years, which are 
characterized by strong fiscal expansions. These electoral fiscal 
expansions have taken place through increases in primary expenditure, 
while the subsequent stabilization efforts were attempted mainly 
through increases in government revenue. 
The stabilization attempts were inadequate, as government revenue 
generally failed to keep up with the trend growth in primary expenditure 
and the electoral expenditure increases. This resulted in a significant 
increase in Greece’s debt to GDP ratio, especially during the 1980s.  
The constraints imposed on Greece from the 1992 Maastricht treaty and 
the euro area rules appear to have resulted in a significant reduction of 
Greece’s primary deficit, which helped stabilize Greece’s debt to GDP 
ratio until 2008. 
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Our findings also suggest that fluctuations in euro area GDP growth have 
a significant impact on Greek primary deficits, through automatic 
stabilizers. A one percent fall in euro area GDP appears to result in a rise 
in the Greek primary deficit by about 0.6 of a percentage point of GDP, 
roughly equally divided between reductions in revenue and increases in 
primary expenditure. 
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Appendix  
 
TABLE 1: Elections and Governing Parties in Greece, 1974-2009 
Election Date Incoming Government and Prime Minister 
1974, November ND (Constantine Karamanlis) 
1977, November ND (Constantine Karamanlis) 
1981, October PASOK (Andreas Papandreou) 
1985, June PASOK (Andreas Papandreou) 
1989, June ND in Coalition with United Left (Tzannis Tzannetakis) 
1989, November National Unity (Xenophon Zolotas) 
1990, April ND (Constantine Mitsotakis) 
1993, October PASOK (Andreas Papandreou) 
1996, September PASOK (Constantine Simitis) 
2000, March PASOK (Constantine Simitis) 
2004, March ND (Costas Karamanlis) 
2007, September ND (Costas Karamanlis) 
2009, October PASOK (George Papandreou) 
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TABLE 2: Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 
 
1. Unit Root Tests 
Variable ADF Statistic* Probability** 
bt -1.434 0.832 
dt -0.936 0.940 
gt -2.828 0.198 
τt -0.085 0.993 
Rt -4.0588 0.016 
y*t -3.354 0.074 
Note: The unit root tests are based on regressions that contain a constant and a 
deterministic trend. * 5% critical value -3.544 under the null of a unit root. ** Based on 
MacKinnon one sided p-values. 
 
2. Johansen Cointegration Tests 
2.1 Unconditional Cointegration Test for bt , gt , τt , Rt , y*t 
Hypothesized 
number of CEs 
Eigenvalue Trace Statistic Probability* 
5% Critical 
Value 
None** 0.776 105.365 0.002 88.804 
At most 1 0.477 50.001 0.414 63.876 
At most 2 0.316 26.048 0.735 42.915 
At most 3 0.221 11.980 0.813 25.872 
At most 4 0.071 2.729 0.907 12.518 
Note: A linear deterministic trend has been included. *MacKinnon Haug Michelis p-values. 
**Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at the 5% level. 
 
2.2 Conditional Cointegration Test for bt , gt , τt , Rt , y*t 
Hypothesized 
number of CEs 
Eigenvalue Trace Statistic Probability* 
5% Critical 
Value 
None** 0.797 138.337 0.000 88.804 
At most 1** 0.536 79.286 0.002 63.876 
At most 2** 0.509 50.858 0.007 42.915 
At most 3 0.353 24.519 0.073 25.872 
At most 4 0.203 8.396 0.221 12.518 
Note: A linear deterministic trend, plus political party, election and euro dummy variables 
have been included. *MacKinnon Haug Michelis p-values. **Trace test indicates 3 
cointegrating equations at the 5% level. 
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TABLE 3: Estimates for the Primary Deficit Reaction Function  
Greece 1975-2009  
Dependent 
Variable 
dt 
(1) 
dt 
(2) 
dt 
(3) 
dt 
(4) 
Constant 
0.020 
(3.586) 
0.023 
(4.141) 
0.020 
(3.895) 
0.024 
(4.055) 
dt-1 
0.406 
(2.860) 
0.322 
(2.960) 
0.404 
(3.514) 
0.312 
(2.952) 
Rt−1bn,t−1
c
 
-0.097 
(-2.723) 
-0.079 
(-2.651) 
-0.097 
(-3.024) 
-0.070 
(-2.506) 
Rt−1bn,t−1
s
 
-0.083 
(-3.080) 
-0.079 
(-2.651) 
-0.083 
(-3.045) 
-0.070 
(-2.506) 
Rt−1be,t−1
c
 
-0.110 
(-2.991) 
-0.079 
(-2.651) 
-0.110 
(-3.319) 
-0.070 
(-2.506) 
Rt−1be,t−1
s
 
-0.110 
(-3.442) 
-0.079 
(-2.651) 
-0.110 
(-3.421) 
-0.070 
(-2.506) 
y*t 
-0.574 
(-4.723) 
-0.631 
(-5.693) 
-0.575 
(-4.710) 
-0.626 
(-5.702) 
Pt 
-0.0003 
(-0.028) 
0.004 
(0.908) 
  
Et 
0.029 
(3.135) 
0.015 
(3.402) 
0.029 
(3.127) 
0.015 
(3.365) 
Mt 
-0.037 
(-2.014) 
-0.044 
(-2.484) 
-0.037 
(-2.039) 
-0.047 
(-2.762) 
t 
0.004 
(4.459) 
0.004 
(5.460) 
0.004 
(5.855) 
0.003 
(5.365) 
R
2 
0.892 0.878 0.892 0.875 
T-N 35-11=24 35-8=27 35-10=25 35-7=28 
  46 
Dependent 
Variable 
dt 
(1) 
dt 
(2) 
dt 
(3) 
dt 
(4) 
SSR 0.003957 0.004483 0.003957 0.004580 
s 0.01284 0.01286 0.01258 0.01279 
DW 2.435 2.598 2.434 2.554 
AUT(2,T-N-2) 3.877 3.876 2.873 3.726 
HET(N-1,T-N) 0.502 0.829 0.430 1.172 
ARCH(1,T-3) 1.163 3.067 1.162 1.946 
NORM(2) 1.639 0.423 1.634 0.286 
Note: OLS estimates. Asymptotic t-ratios based on heteroscedasticity consistent (Eicker-
White) standard errors are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. 
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TABLE 4: System Estimates of the Parameters of the Model 
Greece 1975-2009 
Dependent 
Variable 
gt 
(1) 
τt 
(1) 
gt 
(2) 
τt 
(2) 
Constant 
0.140 
(5.335) 
0.083 
(3.008) 
0.120 
(6.393) 
0.100 
(5.342) 
gt-1 
0.414 
(3.541) 
 
0.507 
(6.208) 
 
τt-1  
0.592 
(4.589) 
 
0.507 
(6.208) 
Rt−1bt−1 
-0.006 
(-0.264) 
0.052 
(2.734) 
-0.010 
(-0.461) 
0.060 
(3.094) 
y*t 
-0.320 
(-3.909) 
0.291 
(3.749) 
-0.315 
(-4.209) 
0.297 
(3.562) 
Pt 
0.009 
(4.081) 
0.003 
(0.454) 
0.009 
(4.313) 
0.004 
(0.753) 
Et 
0.014 
(3.550) 
-0.002 
(-0.701) 
0.014 
(4.259) 
-0.002 
(-0.759) 
Mt 
-0.018 
(-1.581) 
0.015 
(1.952) 
-0.013 
(-1.337) 
0.018 
(2.247) 
t 
0.004 
(4.034) 
0.0003 
(0.408) 
0.003 
(4.491) 
0.0005 
(0.744) 
R
2 
0.972 0.984 0.972 0.984 
s 0.0111 0.0097 0.0113 0.0098 
DET 6.66x10
-9 
 7.03x10
-9 
 
J-statistic 0.120930  0.122058  
Note: Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimates, based on (15a) and (15b). 
Asymptotic t-ratios based on HAC standard errors are in parentheses below the estimated 
coefficients. DET is the determinant of the residual covariance matrix, and the J statistic is a 
χ
2
 test of the over-identifying restrictions. 
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FIGURE 1: The Accumulation of Government Debt 
 
Data Source: European Commission, Statistical Annex of the European Economy, (Spring 
2010) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Deficits of the General Government 
 
Data Source: European Commission, Statistical Annex of the European Economy, (Spring 
2010) 
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FIGURE 3: Government Revenue and Primary Expenditure 
 
Data Source: European Commission, Statistical Annex of the European Economy, (Spring 
2010) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4: Growth Rate of GDP 
 
Data Source: European Commission, Statistical Annex of the European Economy, (Spring 
2010) 
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Data Appendix 
 
Year b g τ R y* E P M 
1970 0.181 0.209 0.227  0.055 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1971 0.188 0.212 0.221 0.939 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1972 0.191 0.212 0.219 0.886 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1973 0.157 0.200 0.205 0.729 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1974 0.212 0.226 0.221 0.920 0.026 1.000 0.000 0.000 
1975 0.184 0.238 0.223 0.864 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1976 0.179 0.236 0.232 0.843 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1977 0.180 0.249 0.236 0.901 0.028 1.000 0.000 0.000 
1978 0.235 0.251 0.237 0.872 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1979 0.228 0.244 0.239 0.847 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1980 0.227 0.243 0.237 0.895 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1981 0.270 0.288 0.230 0.928 0.005 1.000 0.000 0.000 
1982 0.305 0.294 0.258 0.861 0.008 0.000 1.000 0.000 
1983 0.350 0.303 0.267 0.935 0.014 0.000 1.000 0.000 
1984 0.417 0.310 0.273 0.899 0.024 0.000 1.000 0.000 
1985 0.488 0.334 0.273 0.911 0.022 1.000 1.000 0.000 
1986 0.507 0.322 0.285 0.923 0.025 0.000 1.000 0.000 
1987 0.570 0.315 0.292 1.004 0.025 0.000 1.000 0.000 
1988 0.618 0.330 0.292 0.927 0.042 0.000 1.000 0.000 
1989 0.648 0.341 0.286 0.942 0.041 1.000 1.000 0.000 
1990 0.716 0.361 0.310 0.962 0.035 1.000 0.000 0.000 
1991 0.740 0.335 0.321 0.916 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1992 0.790 0.341 0.335 1.006 0.014 0.000 0.000 1.000 
1993 0.991 0.355 0.348 1.036 -0.007 1.000 0.000 1.000 
1994 0.973 0.324 0.366 1.009 0.024 0.000 1.000 1.000 
1995 0.979 0.349 0.370 1.010 0.023 0.000 1.000 1.000 
1996 1.003 0.339 0.378 1.021 0.015 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1997 0.975 0.359 0.393 0.997 0.025 0.000 1.000 1.000 
1998 0.954 0.365 0.409 1.004 0.027 0.000 1.000 1.000 
1999 0.949 0.374 0.417 1.018 0.029 0.000 1.000 1.000 
2000 1.044 0.397 0.434 1.004 0.038 1.000 1.000 1.000 
2001 1.047 0.393 0.413 0.993 0.020 0.000 1.000 1.000 
2002 1.026 0.399 0.406 0.987 0.009 0.000 1.000 1.000 
2003 0.983 0.401 0.394 0.952 0.007 0.000 1.000 1.000 
2004 0.998 0.410 0.385 0.980 0.022 1.000 0.000 1.000 
2005 1.012 0.397 0.390 0.996 0.017 0.000 0.000 1.000 
2006 0.986 0.391 0.396 0.964 0.032 0.000 0.000 1.000 
2007 0.971 0.412 0.402 0.977 0.029 1.000 0.000 1.000 
2008 1.018 0.433 0.401 1.005 0.003 0.000 0.000 1.000 
2009 1.183 0.467 0.379 1.057 -0.044 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Note: d is defined as g-τ. 
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